Abstract-The "Bow-Tie" diagram is a constructive risk management tool, providing a pictorial representation of the relationship between hazards, initiating events, controls and consequences. It is easily understood by management, engineers, OHSE professionals, process operators and maintenance personnel involved in risk management. Rapid risk ranking methods are commonly used to evaluate the risks of simple likelihood-consequence pairs and are straightforward in application. Rapid risk ranking uses descriptors rather than numbers for likelihood, severity and risk, avoiding the common aversion to numerical values. Nonetheless, it is based on an underlying mathematical construction. These two tools have been combined to provide a simple and transparent risk management tool, the Probability Bow-tie, which can be applied to more complicated systems usually found in the process industries. With adherence to conservative assignment rules, the Probability Bow-tie provides a robust method for determining likelihoods for complicated systems, and assists in assessing the adequacy of controls to achieve a company's tolerable risk criteria. This paper presents a practical methodology using Probability Bow-ties for risk assessment using standard spreadsheet computer programs normally available in even the smallest operating companies. Probability Bow-ties were constructed for a new hazardous chemical marine terminal, using spreadsheets to depict the Bow-tie structure and incorporating lookup tables for likelihoods, outcome severities and risk levels. The risk level for individual outcomes and aggregated risk levels for the terminal are calculated by spreadsheet linkages. The methodology is simple in application, is transparent, is easily maintained by the operating company, provides a useful training tool for hazard awareness and presents a realistic appreciation of the value of controls in place.
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1991, a major fire occurred at a chemical storage facility at Coode Island, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. The fires burned for two days, destroying approximately 30 storage tanks, though no terminal personnel or members of the public were injured. Two fire fighting personnel received minor injuries. A subsequent 1998 disaster at the Longford Gas Plant, also in Victoria, prompted the State Government to implement new major hazard facilities regulations aimed at identifying and preventing potential major incidents and limiting their consequences.
J. E. Cockshott is principal of Cockshott Consulting Engineers, Melbourne Australia. The firm provides chemical engineering consulting services to a range of process industries.
Development of a new chemical storage terminal at
Coode Island was therefore undertaken to achieve the objectives of world's best practice and comply with the new Victorian Major Hazard Facilities (MHF) Regulations. These regulations broadly follow other international regulations for the control of major hazard facilities. In particular, they require the operator of the facility to:
• establish and implement a safety management system; • identify major hazards;
• conduct comprehensive safety assessments; and • adopt control measures which eliminate or reduce so far as is practicable, risk to health and safety. The regulations require the operator of the major hazard facility to demonstrate compliance by the preparation and submission of a Safety Case. Hazard identification during the design phase was achieved by conducting process reviews, HAZIDs and HAZOPs. Consequence analysis was performed for each potential major incident (PMI). The identified hazards and adopted control measures and calculated risks were incorporated in a comprehensive risk register. Early discussions with the regulatory authorities indicated a requirement for a detailed discussion of the appropriateness and effectiveness of each control measure associated with the prevention or mitigation of a major incident.
Design of the facility was a collaborative effort of the facility operator and chemical industry clients (represented by the author) and following a review of chemical storage best-practices worldwide, as well as lessons learned from the 1991 fire, incorporated features to minimise the risk to people and the environment. These included:
• 10 kPa design-pressure (rather than atmospheric) storage tanks for all flammable liquids; • nitrogen padding of tanks (except polymerisable products, provided with a depleted oxygen pad);
• vapour balancing of all products;
• hard-piped, product-dedicated stainless steel liquid and vapour pipelines, eliminating hose exchanges, and • SIL-rated instrumentation for critical control systems.
The operator had previous experience of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) studies conducted by third parties, but found that the process did not take sufficient account of specific design features, operational and maintenance practices. It was considered that underlying failure scenarios and the source of failure data were often obscure ("blackbox") and the output was insensitive to what would intuitively be considered significant safety improvements. Traditional QRA was considered an inappropriate tool to provide a comparative evaluation of the appropriateness and effectiveness of individual control measures for the facility.
The operator had selected Bow-Ties as a primary tool for assembling information on hazards, initiating events, control measures and consequences in a form suitable for process operator understanding and training. They provided a holistic view and an appreciation of control measures working together. The operator had also adopted Rapid Risk Ranking (RRR) methodology as a core feature of the risk register and this was universally understood by personnel.
What was needed was a risk assessment tool that took into account the specific design features, engineering and administrative controls incorporated in the design and operation, was simple to develop and maintain, provided the operator with ownership, could be integrated in the operator's safety management system and was transparent at all levels in the operator's organisation and to the regulatory authorities. The tool should build on and complement the operator's existing risk methodology if possible.
It was decided to extend the Bow-Ties to incorporate a semi-quantitative RRR methodology, and use a standard spreadsheet computer program (Microsoft Excel) to perform the arithmetic calculations.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PROBABILITY BOW-TIES

Bow-Tie Diagrams
Bow-Ties graphically display the relationship between hazards, threats, controls and consequences. They are constructed in two parts: the left-hand side and the righthand side. The Bow-Tie concept is depicted in Fig. 1 below. The left hand side depicts the latent hazard, initiating events, preventative controls and initial hazard release.
For MHF Regulations, the hazard release represents a Potential Major Incident (PMI). The right hand side of the Bow-Tie displays the PMI as a starting point, mitigative controls in sequence and the consequences that result from the failure of those controls. The Bow-Tie as applied to a Major Hazard Facility. The diagram provides a simple visualisation of the relationship between the latent hazard, initiating events, a PMI, mitigative controls and the final consequences. Table 1 provides an explanation of the Bow-Tie terms used in this paper. Alternative terms are commonly used; for instance, "barriers" or "safeguards" for control measures, "unwanted consequence" or "top-event" for potential major incident and "final outcome" for consequence.
Rapid Risk Ranking
Rapid Risk Ranking is a simple methodology using qualitative estimates of the likelihood and consequence severity for an unwanted incident, to assess the resultant risk level. The technique is particularly suitable for incorporation in HAZOP studies, where the HAZOP team has industry-and plant-specific experience of the frequency of incidents (including near-misses) and the effectiveness of control measures. Table 2 is a typical generic 5 x 5 RRR matrix 1 . Companies usually tailor the generic matrix to reflect the complexity and severity of potential incidents at a facility. For a major hazard facility, the most serious outcomes are likely to involve a fatality (classified as "Catastrophic") or multiple fatalities. To reduce risk to a tolerable level, the likelihood needs to be reduced to a level well below "rare". Additional categories of likelihood and consequence are therefore usually added to the RRR matrix.
As detailed in the Appendix, RRR matrices have an underlying mathematical structure. If the likelihoods and consequences are calibrated as order-of magnitude steps, a simple multiplication of likelihood and severity level results in risk expressed as an equivalent fatality rate.
Probability Bow-Tie Diagrams
The Probability Bow-Tie (PBT) is the combination of the traditional Bow-Tie diagram and the Rapid Risk Ranking method. The PBT uses the structure of the Bow-Tie to define the sequence between an initiating event, through preventative control measures to the PMI, and from the PMI through mitigative control measures to consequences, or final outcomes.
The PBT is set up in a spreadsheet, and the required skill set is available in even the smallest organisation. Modules are constructed which are pasted into the PBT to represent the elements described in Table 1 .
The basis of the initiating event frequency calculation or assumption is recorded in the PBT. This task is the same as for other methods of risk analyses, and should be based on company standards, references or experience. Descriptors are used to enter the probability of failure of each control measure. The PBT structure ensures that the appropriate linkages are made so that the risk level is calculated automatically.
The Appendix describes setting up the modules and constructing the PBT. Protocols are described in the next section to ensure that the analysis is rigorous and the results robust.
The advantages of using the PBT are immediately apparent. Firstly, the pictorial nature of the traditional BowTie is retained showing the relationship between elements that contribute to risk and those that control it. If rigour is applied to the assignment of control measure effectiveness, and also for their independence (for instance using the AIChemE LOPA rules to assure independence 2 ) the results will be robust.
Companies already using Bow-Ties to visualise the relationship of control measures will benefit from a semiquantitative appreciation of the effectiveness of those controls. Use of PBTs may eliminate weak controls and indicate if existing controls need to be strengthened or additional controls added
Companies using RRR as part of their risk management methodology will benefit from the pictorial view of the control measure string and a more rigorous methodology for estimating the likelihood of an incident occurring. Table 6 Companies using LOPA will benefit from the pictorial representation as the underlying calculations are the same, and will produce equivalent results after calibrating the RRR matrix.
Figures 2A & 2B depict an example of a single string for both sides of a typical PBT. In practice, many strings are involved on both the preventative and the mitigative sides.
III. PROBABILITY BOW-TIE PROTOCOLS
PBT Construction
With the modules set up as described in the Appendix, constructing the PBT is relatively simple. Each module box is placed in the spreadsheet so that the correct output from the last module is captured as input. The module can then be moved as required, retaining the appropriate cell reference.
Group Input
Once the PBT has been constructed, each module needs to be reviewed by a team having the appropriate capabilities and experience in risk engineering, design, operations and maintenance. Where control measures include automatic process and safety systems, the appropriate engineering disciplines should be included so that failure probabilities are properly assessed.
Recording Assumptions and Calculations
All assumptions and intermediate calculations should be entered into the spreadsheet below the relevant module. This will provide a record for future modifications and assist the SMS audit process. Where company or external sources are used (for example, initiating event frequency or failure rate) these should be referenced.
Independence of Control Measures
Traditional Bow-Ties often include such control measures as training, certification, procedures, inspection & testing, maintenance, communications and signage.
Each control measure in the underlying Bow-Tie should be reviewed for independence and effectiveness when incorporated in the PBT. The AIChemE book "Layers of Protection Analysis" 2 provides guidelines for assessing the independence of control measures. For instance, training, certification and procedures are not considered Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) but may be taken into account in assessing whether process operator action is a valid IPL. However, the effectiveness takes account of the A minimum of 5 tankers need to be unloaded extra ullage provided for all tanks (1 metre above SFL) after safe fill level before the tank invert level A minimum of 5 tankers need to be unloaded is reached (design feature) -1 day's filling after safe fill level before the tank invert level operations for the subject tank.
is reached (design feature) -1 day's filling operatons.
Figure 2A: Simplified Example of Probability Bow-Tie Construction
The figure depicts single sequences of initiating event through to consequence for liquid loss of containment (LOC Liquid), due to storage tank overfill resulting from road ranker unloading operations. In practice, each Probability Bow-Tie (PBT) has many initiating events and sequences. Release of spill outside bund is likely Spill quantity = truck load (max 30 tonnes) to find an ignition source.
PROBABILITY BOW-TIE: RIGHT-HAND SIDE
However, fire will spread No sucessful outcome considered valid.
Potential Knock-on Effects Potential multiple fatality
Figure 2B: Simplified Example of Probability Bow-Tie Construction
The figure depicts single sequence of initiating event through to consequence for liquid loss of containment (LOC Liquid), due to storage tank overfill resulting from road ranker unloading operations. In practice, each Probability Bow-Tie (PBT) has many initiating events and sequences.
The discipline involved in having to enter a failure probability in the PBT will generally identify such nonindependent control measures. These may be eliminated from the PBT or "Credit Not Taken" may be selected from the drop-down list (failure probability = 1.0).
Common cause failure was addressed by the PBT team as they evaluated the strength of each control measure. The approach taken was to provide no credit for controls potentially subject to dependent failure. Thus, although all storage tanks were provided with dual pressure transmitters (a requirement of the EPA for continuous monitoring), no credit was taken for this redundancy in the PBTs.
In the case of overfill protection, independent high-high level alarms and shutdown systems (using different sensor technology and SIS control circuits) were installed in addition to normal level measurement in the BPCS. Credit was taken for the high-high level alarm and shutdown system as an independent control measure.
Conservatism
Different approaches may be used by organisations in terms of the assumptions used in their risk analysis methodology. Assumptions may be "conservative" or "realistic". Whatever approach is taken, the assumptions should be applied consistently, and the risk guidelines should reflect the approach used 3 . Our suggestion is that assumptions should be made conservatively, so that the resultant risk profile potentially overestimates risk.
Facility Risk
Once all PBTs have been developed for a facility, individual consequence risk levels can be summed and the total facility risk compared with company risk guidelines.
Linkages
It is likely that some PMIs or consequences will be initiating events in other PBTs. Therefore, the spreadsheet files should be saved in the same file folder, and "Update Links" should always be selected when opening files.
Analysis of Risk
In addition to the comparison of the risk level of an individual consequence or total risk level against company guidelines, it is possible to assign the risk level associated with each of the initiating events. Clearly, the risk level of the PMI is the sum of the risk levels for each of the righthand-side consequences. Each PBT sequence therefore has a proportional risk level associated with it (in proportion to its frequency). The PBT may therefore be further analysed by working back through each sequence, and assigning risk levels at each branch leading back to the initiating event. In this manner, it is possible to rank the initiating events as contributors to the total facility risk.
Criticality of Control Measures
Another useful application of the PBTs is the review of key or critical control measures. The technique is to assign "Credit not Taken" to the control measure. The effect on the risk level of the PMI, total risk level or the ranking of the initiating event can be studied. This provides an immediate appreciation of the value of individual control measures, and assists the operator in focussing on the key performance indicators (KPIs) needed to assure the integrity of critical controls. 
Sensitivity of Results
The lookup tables are not data in the normal sense. They are merely translations of probability descriptors to numerical values (for control measures) translations of likelihood values to descriptors (for frequencies) and calculated risk values to descriptors (for risk). The calculation of risk is therefore sensitive only to the input data -frequency of initiating event and failure probabilities. The basis for these input values is recorded transparently on the PBT diagram.
With conservatism applied to the input data, as suggested, the results of PBT studies will err on the conservative side.
IV. CASE STUDY -MARINE CHEMICALS TERMINAL
Marstel Coode Island Terminal
The methodology described in this paper was applied to the new Coode Island Chemical Terminal of Marstel Terminals Pty Ltd. The terminal receives marine parcels of liquid chemicals which are stored at the facility and loaded out by road tanker to the local chemical manufacturing industry, which owns the goods. Some products are received from road tankers and exported by ship.
Source documentation was compiled and reviewed. This included engineering documentation, HAZID and HAZOP reports, the Risk Register, Fire Safety Study, SIL Report, reports on neighbouring site risks, and the results of consequence studies. Traditional Bow-Ties were drafted in a workshop using a logical division of the plant areas and a division of PMIs into three generic categories (LOC Liquid, LOC Vapour, Fire & Explosion). This matrix was further developed to represent specific product groups.
The operator had incorporated an RRR tool in its Safety Management System (SMS) and its personnel were familiar with its use for risk assessment during HAZOP sessions. Table 3 is the operator's RRR likelihood table, extended to seven levels for PBT output display.
The PBT methodology was applied conservatively. Administrative controls include general procedures such as training, work permit systems, incident reporting and so forth. They also include operating procedures which define how manual operations are to be conducted.
Whereas procedures for training, certification and work permit systems as well as other safeguards such as general communications, signage and maintenance are clearly key measures contributing to plant safety, they are assumed to be in place and working correctly. They are not identified as primary independent control measures for inclusion in the PBT, in line with the AIChemE LOPA rules 2 . For instance, "Control of Ignition Sources" is one identified control measure. The component design features and procedures that contribute to the value of this control are noted below the PBT control measure module: "hazardous area classification & electrical compliance, and exclusion of ignition sources and hot work permit procedures". A review of each of these components was made to assess the failure probability for the identified control measure.
Whilst the general administrative procedures described above are not considered primary control measures in the construction of PBTs, the nature of bulk liquid chemical terminal operations is that many manual operations are conducted by process operators. Ship-to-shore transfer is one such operation, involving several administrative procedures: tank ullage calculations, line-up of liquid and vapour pipelines, connection of hoses at the ship, leak testing, line walks, communications with the ship, monitoring of filling, pigging lines and so forth. Failure of these operational procedures may lead to potentially hazardous situations.
This approach allowed specific design features, engineering controls and specific operational procedures that had been incorporated in the design and operation to be taken into account, whilst preserving the notion of independent control measures. (It is noted that, if an audit revealed deficiencies in the underlying general procedures, the control measure should be re-evaluated and the impact on risk determined.)
The operator adopted limitations on the control measure failure probabilities entered into the PBTs and these are listed in Table 4 . Table 5 is the operator's consequence table, used to define the severity of an incident. This is a seven-level table with successive levels notionally representing order-of magnitude steps of increasing severity. Selection was based on the consequence analyses or experience for the lower severity outcomes. Table 6 is the operator's 8 x 6 risk ranking matrix, notionally used to estimate the resultant risk level. In practice, the PBT performs a multiplication to calculate the equivalent fatality rate (EFR) and this is compared with the EFR for each risk level descriptor. The category "Extreme Catastrophe" was redefined as that resulting in three onsite fatalities to properly represent the actual deployment of personnel at the facility and extent of impact from the consequence analyses. The key to Table 6 indicates the numerical equivalence of the descriptive risk level.
Whereas the objective of control measures is to eliminate risk wherever possible, all risks can not be eliminated and it is important to clearly define the tolerability of the residual risk (Hendershot 3 ). The operator established the criteria that the level of risk for a single incident was tolerable at the "Low" risk level with an equivalent fatality rate (EFR) of 10 -6 per year and that the total risk was tolerable at an EFR of 10 -5 per year. These tolerable levels were established after a review of national and international risk guidelines and against a background of a conservative application of the RRR methodology.
General Findings
The operator reported to the author that the PBT methodology and format was "found to provide transparent, useful results, in a format that is suitable for personnel training and communication to persons with limited risk engineering training." As all process operators were new hires, the PBTs played an important role in process operator training. The traditional pictorial Bow-Ties were used as the primary training tool for understanding the relationship between hazards, initiating events, control measures and consequences. The PBTs then provided the operators with a deeper understanding of the strength of individual control measures -for example, the level of risk reduction provided by SIL-rated safety integrity functions (e.g. for overfill protection) and the need for security access for some basic process control system functions.
Engineering and management personnel reported that:
• direct involvement in the development of the PBTs provided "ownership" of the risk assessment, which, in turn eased communication of risk to process operators and particularly assisted with communications with the regulatory authorities;
• the method provided a sound understanding of the value of individual controls, including those that were inherently weak, and provided focus for the development of operating procedures within the SMS.
Results
The study revealed that facility risk was highly dependent on the number of operations (receipts, deliveries and transfers) as would be expected intuitively. Though many terminal operations involve operational procedures rather than relying on automatic control (and the applied protocols limited the value attributed to such procedural control measures) the high level of engineering controls applied to this state-of-the-art facility resulted in very low levels of risk. The study concluded that the overall risk for the facility (including both onsite and offsite population) was 3 x 10 -6 EFR, meeting the operator's overall risk criterion (1 x 10 -5 pa). All individual risk contributors met the operator's criterion of 1 x 10 -6 EFR. The principle contributors to risk are presented in Table 7 below which includes all initiating events presenting a risk greater than 1 x 10 -7 EFR. Certain operations involving phenol contributed the highest risk. In the construction of the PBTs, no account had been taken of mitigation due to personal protective equipment (PPE). Conservatively, a spill of molten phenol was assumed to result in a fatality to exposed personnel due to skin absorption. The SMS included appropriate safety precautions (including the use of fully encapsulating chemical suits) for handling phenol as well as strict training requirements and a requirement for signage in potential spill areas. In consideration of these procedures, no additional control measures were adopted.
Third party (offsite) impacts were the next highest risk contributor. These resulted from a neighbouring terminal site. The Emergency Response Plan and Procedures (ERPP) were reviewed, to ensure that timely incident identification and safe evacuation procedures were in place.
Other initiating events ranked at the higher levels of calculated risk were similarly reviewed.
Following the initial development of the PBTs for the facility, modifications were made to the import-export logistics, and certain storage tanks were reassigned to other chemicals. In particular, the terminal configuration was modified for phenol import rather than export. The PBTs were modified with little effort to reflect these changes.
Because of the modular methodology used for constructing the PBTs, these were automatically scaled to each scenario. Thus, complex systems automatically resulted in complex PBT structures, whereas simple systems with few initiating events resulted in simple structures. The approach was found to be equally applicable to major hazard scenarios and those having lesser outcomes. The regulatory authority, Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) accepted the PBT analyses as demonstration of the viability and effectiveness of control measures to reduce the facility risk so far as practical.
APPENDIX
PBT Calculations
The frequency for each PMI occurring is the product of the frequency of the initiating event and fractional failure probabilities of each preventive control measure, summed for each initiating event sequence:
The frequency of the initiating event is estimated from the best available data. This may be the number of occurrences per year (for instance of tank filling operations) or be drawn from an appropriate database or the experience of team members. The fractional probability of the failure of each control measure will also be based on the best information and judgement available (SIL ratings for safety instrumented systems, experience for operational procedures).
Similarly, the frequency of occurrence for each consequence is the product of the frequency of the PMI and the fractional probability of each of the mitigative control measures for each sequence leading to a consequence:
Each consequence is ranked for severity based on the consequence analysis for that outcome. The risk level is determined by the RRR methodology. In practice, the equivalent fatality rate, EFR, is calculated as the product of the frequency of a particular consequence and its consequence level.
For ease of calculation, and to maintain the pictorial value of the Bow-Tie, PBTs are constructed using a spreadsheet with standard modules for each element (initiating event, control measure and so forth). Each module is simple to set up requiring only basic spreadsheet capability. The use of standard modules is preferred to minimise construction errors, for efficiency and to maintain consistency. Fig 3 shows the initiating event module. There are two ways to enter the initiating event frequency. Either a frequency descriptor is selected in the central cell from a drop-down list (the value F IE is obtained from a LOOKUP table and when selected is displayed in the cell below).
Initiating Event Module
Alternatively, "Calc Freq" is selected from the drop-down list and the value of F IE is obtained from a value calculated below the module box.
To avoid input errors and over-writing data, only the text box is available for direct data entry.
If the initiating event frequency is a calculated value, the calculation and assumptions are set out clearly below the module box for transparency and audit purposes. The initiating event module comprises a description of the initiating event, a field for entering the frequency as a descriptor, and fields displaying the input event frequency (from a LOOKUP table) and the output frequency to the subsequent module.
Exposure Module
The initiating event frequency must be modified if every instance does not lead to the threat of releasing the hazard.
For instance, when filling storage tanks from road tankers, the threat of overfill only exists when the storage tank is already close to its safe fill level. An exposure module is used to take account of the exposure level. The probability is again selected from a drop-down list and is displayed in the box below. The module multiplies the input frequency by the exposure probability to derive the modified output probability. 
Control Measure Module
For the control measure module, input of the failure probability is made by selection of a probability descriptor from a drop-down list. The numerical value is displayed below the descriptor.
The input frequency is taken from the previous module and is multiplied by the probability of failure to calculate the resultant frequency in the lower right-hand cell. Many control measures, if successful, will prevent the unwanted consequence altogether. In other cases, the success of a control measure may lead to another chain of events of lower consequence severity. The control measure module may be used for both preventative and mitigative control measures. Where the success of the control measure eliminated any subsequent outcome, only the value of F OUT,F is carried forward.
The control measure module therefore has two outputsevent frequency on failure and event frequency on success. The latter is particularly used on the mitigative side of the bow-tie (for instance if ignition control measures are successful, the result of a loss of liquid containment might result in a contained spill; the failure of ignition control measure might result in a flash fire or pool fire).
PMI Module
The PMI Module has no inputs except for the textual description. The value for F PMI is the sum of the final frequencies of all sequences leading to the PMI. This calculation is manually input into the cell. The Excel "reviewing" toolbar is useful to ensure that the correct inputs have been collected. The PMI Frequency descriptor is derived from a LOOKUP table for the value of F PMI . The cell representing F PMI is the sum of the probabilities for all sequences leading to the PMI.
Consequence Likelihood, Severity and Risk Modules
These modules are placed in the PBT as a group. Examples are shown in Figure 2 .
The consequence likelihood module takes the calculated consequence frequency from the last mitigative control measure. The frequency descriptor is obtained from a LOOKUP table.
The consequence severity module is used to enter the severity level from a consequence analysis of the final outcome, from a drop-down list (see Table 5 ). The basis of the severity level is entered below the module box for review and auditing purposes. A LOOKUP table is used to convert the descriptive severity level to a numerical value of equivalent fatality. The risk level module performs the RRR matrix lookup, and the risk level is displayed as a descriptor and as a numerical value.
"AND" and "OR" Gates
Frequencies for the same event (PMI and Consequence Likelihood) are additive. The Excel "reviewing" toolbar is useful to ensure that the correct inputs have been collected.
Care should be taken handling situations where concurrent events are required to release a hazard. For instance, if one series of a left-hand side PBT leads to the presence of a flammable mixture and another series leads to sources of ignition, and both are expressed as a frequency, these cannot simply be added to establish the frequency of an explosion or fire. One must be converted to a fractional probability (for instance the fractional presence of any ignition source). Kletz 4 describes "AND" and "OR" gates for fault trees and this technique should be applied.
Kletz also describes the dependence of hazard rate on the test interval and demand rate. If a failure rate is used to establish the failure probability for a control measure, the failure rate should be adjusted for high demand rates. With SIL-rated SIFs, the SIL level is equivalent to a failure probability.
